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In Phillpott v. Phillpott,' the court held that unjustified, persist-
ent denial of sexual intercourse constitutes cruel treatment within the
meaning of Civil Code article 138. Apparently, a deciding factor in
the court's conclusion was that the husband had refused sexual inter-
course, which has been held to be a marital obligation,' for a period
of almost ten years, clearly satisfying the "persistent" requirement.
The court indicated that a justified refusal might occur when the
spouse was suffering from an illness or the other spouse was guilty of
some grave fault.3 Citing the Phillpott decision, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal in Bourque v. Landry4 stated in dicta that the wife's
refusal of sexual intercourse under the circumstances might be justi-
fied5 and affirmed the trial judge's finding of fact that the husband
abandoned his wife without just cause, though the trial judge had not
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
This survey of decisions does not include discussion of Warren v. Richard, 296 So.
2d 813 (La. 1974); Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675 (La. 1974); Taylor v. Taylor, 295 So.
2d 494 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); McConkey v. Pinto, 289 So. 2d 540 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1973), writs granted, 293 So. 2d 166 (La. 1974). These decisions are considered in
student casenotes to be published.
1. 285 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
2. Mudd v. Mudd, 206 La. 1055, 20 So. 2d 311 (1944); Bourque v. Landry, 293
So. 2d 218 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
3. "Furthermore, persistent refusal of sexual union, in the absence of consent or
sickness or grave fault on the other spouse's part, is perhaps the basest of marital
cruelty and outrage." (Emphasis added.) 285 So. 2d 570, 571 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
4. 293 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
5. The wife had given birth to six children in rapid succession and a seventh after
a complicated pregnancy.
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placed much credence in the testimony of either husband or wife.
Generally, under R.S. 9:2916 a married woman may not during
the existence of the marriage sue her husband to enforce any substan-
tive right. Although the husband by virtue of article 120 of the Civil
Code is required to furnish his wife "with whatever is required for the
convenience of life," 7 the wife may not enforce this obligation civilly
during the existence of the marriage. In Lyons v. Landry,' the father
of the defendant's wife from whom the defendant was living separate
and apart (not judicially) sought to recover sums expended for the
support of his daughter. Reversing the trial court's decision sustain-
ing an exception of no cause of action, the First Circuit Court of
Appeal held the obligation of the husband under article 120 "is para-
mount to any obligation of the parent created by LSA-C.C. article
229 in this case."' The case was remanded to the trial court to deter-
mine if in fact the action of the father against the husband was within
the purview of articles 120 and 1786.1 Thus, the wife may successfully
circumvent the prohibition against suing her husband by requesting
expenses for "necessaries" from her parents who may in turn recover
from her husband - perhaps a desirable result.
6. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1960): "As long as the marriage continues and the
spouses are not separated judicially a married woman may not sue her husband except
for:
(1) A separation of property;
(2) The restitution and enjoyment of her paraphernal property;
(3) A separation from bed and board; or
(4) A divorce."
7. LA. Civ. CODE art. 120: "The wife is bound to live with her husband and to
follow him wherever he chooses to reside; the husband is obliged to receive her and to
furnish her with whatever is required for the convenience of life, in proportion to his
means and condition."
8. 293 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
9. Id. at 675. LA. CIv. CODE art. 229: "Children are bound to maintain their father
and mother and other ascendants, who are in need; and the relatives in the direct
ascending line are likewise bound to maintain their needy descendants, this obligation
being reciprocal."
10. "After all, whether the wife was in necessitous circumstances thus making her
an agent of the defendant to contract for the payment or repayment of these expendi-
tures is a fact matter to be considered from the evidence presented in the trial of the
case." 293 So. 2d 674, 675 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974). LA. CIv. CODE art. 1786: "The
incapacity of the wife is removed by the authorization of the husband, or, in cases
provided by law, by that of the judge.
"The authorization of the husband to the commercial contracts of the wife is
presumed by law, if he permits her to trade in her own name; to her contracts for
necessaries for herself and family, where he does not himself provide them; and to all
her other contracts, when he is himself a party to them.
"The unauthorized contracts made by married women, like the acts of minors,
may be made valid after the marriage is dissolved, either by express or implied ratifica-
tion."
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USE OF BLOOD TESTS IN ACTION EN DESAVEU
In 1972, the Louisiana Legislature enacted the Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity," which authorizes the use of
blood tests in any civil action in which paternity is an issue, sets out
certain procedural rules, and prescribes the effect to be given test
results. Although it is characterized as ancillary to the Civil Code, the
Uniform Act does not expressly refer to any particular provision
thereof, nor has the Legislature made any subsequent attempt to
amend relevant Civil Code articles. The Uniform Act clearly affects
to some degree those articles which set forth and restrict the right of
a husband to bring an action en desaveu," but, since passage, its
precise effect thereon has been a source of speculation.' 3
Two cases recently decided by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal
raised for the first time judicially the question of the interrelationship
of the Uniform Act and the existing structure of the disavowal action.
In Brugman v. Prejean," husband had married wife with full know-
ledge that she was then pregnant; the child was born within 180 days
of the marriage; husband had signed as father at the registering of
the birth. More than sixteen months after birth, husband filed suit
to disavow paternity, apparently on the basis that blood tests would
show that he could not be the biological father of the child. The court
held that the Uniform Act does not create a new cause of action for
disavowing paternity, and that, consequently, the six month pre-
scriptive period of Civil Code articles 191 and 192 barred husband's
suit.'
The court went out of its way, however, to discuss the effect of
Civil Code article 190, which by its terms prohibits a husband from
contesting the legitimacy of a child born within 180 days of the mar-
11. LA. R.S. 9:396-98 (Supp. 1972).
12. LA. R.S. 9:397.3: "The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wed-
lock is overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts. . . show that
the husband is not the father of the child."
13. See R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE 258 (1973); Comment, 33 LA.
L. REv. 646 (1973).
14. 288 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
15. LA. CiV. CODE art. 191: "In all the cases above enumerated, where the pre-
sumption of paternity ceases, the husband of the mother, if he intends to dispute the
legitimacy of the child, must do it within six months from the birth of the child, if he
be in the parish where the child is born, or within six months after his return, if he be
absent at that time, or within six months after the discovery of the fraud, if the birth
of the child was concealed from him; or he shall be barred from making any objection
to the legitimacy of such child." Id. art. 192 preserves for the husband's heirs a six
month period if the husband should die before the expiration of the term specified by
article 191.
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riage, when he either knew of the pregnancy of his wife prior to the
marriage or signed as father at the registering of the birth or bap-
tism.'" The court declared that husband in the instant case had
stated no cause of action, because he had alleged in his petition just
those facts which would bar his action under article 190.
The facts of Smith v. Smith'" are essentially the same as those
in Brugman, except that suit for disavowal had been instituted
timely. The court held, consistently with its Brugman opinion, that
husband had no cause of action where the child had been born within
180 days of marriage and where husband had signed as father at the
registering of the birth. The court concerned itself with whether the
Uniform Act repealed or conflicted with article 190. The writer be-
lieves, however, that the court should have first analyzed the codal
structure of the action en desaveu and then determined the proper
scope of article 190.
Until the presumption of paternity ceases, a cause of action does
not exist. Before 1972, Civil Code articles 185 through 189 provided
the exclusive instances in which the presumption of paternity ceased.
By declaring that the "presumption of legitimacy" ceases where the
experts conclude non-paternity on the basis of blood tests, the Uni-
form Act created an additional ground to support the cause of action.
Thus, Brugman correctly held that an action based on the evidence
of blood tests must be brought within the time limits of articles 191
and 192.
The presumption of paternity under article 184 extends only to
those children conceived during the marriage.'" The child born capa-
ble of living within 180 days of the marriage is not presumed to be
the child of the husband, because it is presumed in such a case that
conception occurred outside the marriage.'" Nonetheless, as Professor
Pascal has pointed out, the law is structured in such a manner as to
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 190: "The husband can not contest the legitimacy of the
child born previous to the one hundred and eightieth day of marriage, in the following
cases:
"1. If he was acquainted with the circumstances of his wife being pregnant
previously to the marriage.
"2. If he was present at the registering of the birth or baptism of the child and
signed the same, or if not knowing how to sign, he put his ordinary mark to it, in
presence of two witnesses."
17. 300 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
18. LA. CIv. CODE art. 184: "The law considers the husband of the mother as the
father of all children conceived during the marriage."
19. LA. CIv. CODE art. 186: "The child capable of living, which is born before the
one hundred and eightieth day after the marriage, is not presumed to be the child of
the husband. .. ."
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protect the child so born.20 First, the husband is required to take
affirmative action to disavow the child and must do so within the six
month period of articles 191 and 192. Second, article 190 prevents the
husband from contesting the legitimacy of the child if he married the
mother knowing that she was pregnant or if he signed either the birth
or baptismal registration as father.
Viewed in relation to the total structure of the disavowal action,
article 190 is intended to effect quickly and quietly the legitimation
of an illegitimate child whose illegitimacy rests on conception prior
to marriage. There is a real question in the writer's mind whether its
provisions should bar an action which is based upon the evidence of
blood tests rather than upon the presumption that conception oc-
curred outside marriage. The result of Smith can be defended on the
basis of the unconditional language of article 190, but it can be criti-
cized as ignoring the legislative intent and as promoting inconsis-
tency in the application of the laws.
One distinction becomes very important as a result of the Smith
decision. A child born 181 days after the marriage is presumed to be
legitimate; his legitimacy is nonetheless subject to attack under the
Uniform Act by the husband and presumed father, even though the
husband may have married his wife knowing that she was pregnant
and even though the husband may have signed as father at the regis-
tering of the birth. On the other hand, a child born 179 days after the
marriage, presumed illegitimate, is absolutely protected from such an
attack under the aforementioned circumstances. It is very doubtful
that the Legislature even foresaw such a result. This anomaly illus-
trates the perils of adopting a "uniform law" without paying proper
attention to the existing structure of the law. The resolution of the
problem must be referred to the Legislature, whose task it is to re-
structure the law in order to evince clearly a legislative intent.
EFFECT OF PRIOR ADJUDICATION OF FAULT UPON ALIMONY INCIDENTAL TO
DIVORCE
It is usual for a judgment of separation to be based on the fault
of one of the spouses.2 Alimony incidental to divorce may be granted,
under the terms of Civil Code article 160, only to the wife who "has
20. R. PASCAL, LOUISIAA FAMILY LAW COURSE 213-14 (1973).
21. LA. CIv. CODE art. 138 lists nine grounds for obtaining a separation from bed
and board. Only the last may be classified as no-fault: "When the husband and wife
have voluntarily lived separate and apart for one year and no reconciliation has taken
place during that time."
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not been at fault. 2 2 A question of recurring interest 23 is what effect,
if any, in a subsequent action for alimony incidental to divorce,
should a court give to a prior adjudication of fault in a separation
proceeding.
In Fulmer v. Fulmer,24 the Louisiana supreme court attempted
a definitive resolution of the problem. In that case, wife had obtained
a contested separation on the ground of abandonment. After a lapse
of one year and sixty days, husband filed suit for final divorce and
wife demanded alimony incidental to the divorce. The Louisiana su-
preme court held that the determination of "fault" in the separation
proceeding barred re-litigation of the "fault" issue for purposes of
article 160 so that husband was prevented from introducing evidence
of wife's fault.
Factually, the Fulmer case could be distinguished from those
cases where the wife had obtained a separation based on fault other
than abandonment or where the action for separation had not been
contested.25 However, the significance of Fulmer lies in its attempt
to go beyond the instant facts and to lay down authoritative rules
governing the application of article 160. The court concluded that
"fault," in the context of article 160, had reference to the traditional
concept of fault, on which an action for separation or divorce might
be founded. In arriving at its decision, the court carefully reasoned
its way through the legislative history of article 160, and its interpre-
tation of that article is plausible and well supported. It is now clear
that, whenever one spouse's fault has been adjudicated in a separa-
22. LA. CIv. CODE art. 160: "When the wife has not been at fault, and she has not
sufficient means for her support, the court may allow her, out of the property and
earnings of the husband, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his income when:
1. The wife obtains a divorce; 2. The husband obtains a divorce on the ground that he
and his wife have been living separate and apart, or on the ground that there has been
no reconciliation between the spouses after a judgment of separation from bed and
board, for a specified period of time; or 3. The husband obtained a valid divorce from
his wife in a court of another state or country which had no jurisdiction over her person.
This alimony shall be revoked if it becomes unnecessary, and terminates if the wife
remarries."
23. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for 1972-1973
Term-Persons, 34 LA. L. Rxv. 201 (1974). Recent cases which have appeared since
that article include Frederic v. Frederic, 295 So. 2d 52 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974);
Nethken v. Nethken, 292 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); In re Williams, 288 So.
2d 401 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Kratzberg v. Kratzberg, 286 So. 2d 174 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973).
24. 301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974).
25. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Persons, 34 LA. L. REv. 201 (1974). Such distinctions had emerged from the
welter of decisions handed down by the courts of appeal.
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tion proceeding, the effect of the determination is to forever preclude
re-litigation of wife's fault for purposes of article 160.26
As was noted in the opinion, the decision promotes judicial econ-
omy and consistency. However, it will also work injustice on those
spouses who choose not to contest the action for separation in order
to avoid the unseemliness of a public trial. The power to resolve this
problem resides with the Legislature and not with the courts. Once
again,27 this writer suggests that a spouse be permitted to obtain a
separation on the basis of living separate and apart for a period of
thirty days in order to make more accessible a no-fault ground.
SUPPORT FOR EIGHTEEN-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN
The obligation of a parent to his children is, of course, far greater
during their minority than after they have attained the age of major-
ity.8 In 1972, the Louisiana Legislature lowered the age of majority
to eighteen. 9 The consequences of this change are now being felt by
children who had looked to their parents for financial assistance in
obtaining college educations.
In Demarie v. Demarie0 and Dubroc v. Dubroc,3' two courts of
appeal both held that an adult child, i.e., one who has attained the
age of eighteen, has no right to obtain support from his parents in
order to secure a college education. It is clear that these decisions
correctly interpret the existing legislation, since Civil Code article 230
expressly limits to minors the right to the expenses of an education."
It is equally clear, however, that the result breeds hardship for
children of divorced parents. Remedial legislation is urgently needed
to give adults under the age of twenty-one a right to support from
their parents for purposes of obtaining an education.
26. It is now clear that even where the wife had obtained a separation based on
fault other than abandonment, the adjudication of the husband's fault necessarily
implies her own freedom from fault.
27. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Court for the 1972-1973
Term-Persons, 34 LA. L. REv. 201, 203-04 (1974).
28. See id. at 204.
29. La. Acts 1972, No. 98 § 1, amending LA. Civ. CODE art. 37.
30. 295 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
31. 284 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
32. LA. Civ. CODE art. 230: "By alimony we understand what is necessary for the
nourishment, lodging and support of the person who claims it.
"It includes the education, when the person to whom the alimony is due, is a
minor."
